San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge  
Worker Safety  
Better State Oversight Is Needed to Ensure That Injuries Are Reported Properly and That Safety Issues Are Addressed

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Department of Industrial Relations’ and the California Department of Transportation’s responses as of April 2007

The Joint Legislative Audit Committee (audit committee) asked the Bureau of State Audits to evaluate the Department of Industrial Relations’ (department) Division of Occupational Safety and Health’s (division) enforcement of worker safety and health laws and the California Department of Transportation’s (Caltrans) oversight practices on construction of the East Span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge (East Span).

In addition, the audit committee asked us to compare the number of injuries reported by workers on the East Span with the number reported on other large construction projects. The audit committee also asked us to evaluate the workplace safety policies, including any safety bonus programs of companies contracted to work on the East Span, and determine whether any disciplinary action has been taken against workers complaining of injuries or health issues. We focused our review on the safety of workers involved in construction of the Skyway project because it is the largest, most expensive component of the East Span currently being constructed and was at the center of certain media allegations. The Skyway is a section of the new East Span stretching most of the distance from Oakland to Yerba Buena Island.

Finding #1: The division does not exercise sufficient control over the injury reporting process to ensure that employers properly report injuries.

Although the reported injury rate of the prime contractor for the Skyway project is one-fourth that of the injury rate of similar projects, we question whether relying upon these statistics as an indication of project safety conditions is justified. The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (federal OSHA) Form 300: Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses (annual injury report), which employers are required to complete, summarizes the workplace injuries as defined in regulations, occurring during the year and is the basis for the calculation of injury rates. The acting chief of the division explained that division investigators review annual injury reports and may ask employees about injuries as part of on-site inspections, but the division does not collect these reports and it does not have a systematic process to detect injuries that go unrecorded. In addition, the acting chief stated that because the resources of the division are finite, a decision to invest resources into the policing of the recording of injuries in the annual injury reports necessarily means that other resource-dependent activities will suffer. Consequently, the division was not aware of a number of alleged workplace injuries and an alleged illness that potentially meet recording requirements but were not included in annual injury reports of the Skyway’s prime contractor.
To identify the underreporting of workplace injuries and to help ensure the reasonable accuracy of annual injury reports, we recommended that the division develop a mechanism to obtain employers’ annual injury reports and design procedures to detect the underreporting of workplace injuries. If the division believes it does not have the resources necessary to undertake this task in light of its other priorities, it should seek additional funding from the Legislature for this effort. In designing these procedures, the division should take into account conditions that may attribute to the underreporting of injuries.

**Division’s Action: None.**

The division has concluded that developing a mechanism to obtain and review employers’ annual injury reports to detect the underreporting of workplace injuries is impractical without having an electronic information management system. Further, it believes that the site investigation needed to establish a violation based on such a review would be time consuming. Using its recent investigation of the Skyway’s prime contractor, Kiewit/FCI/Manson, a joint venture (KFM) as an example, the division indicates the investigation required over 400 hours of an inspector’s time as well as managerial and legal review to find evidence that violations occurred. The division also states that stakeholders at an April 2006 meeting of the Cal/OSHA Advisory Committee (advisory committee) concluded that reviewing employers’ annual injury reports for the underreporting of workplace injuries would not be in the best interest of the division. Rather, the division indicates it is working with another division within the department on the feasibility of electronically receiving employer’s reports of injury and possibly physician’s reports of injury, which would facilitate an automated review of these reports for targeting workplaces most likely to cause death or serious injury to workers.

Finding #2: The division did not follow up adequately on all Skyway complaints.

The division did not adequately follow up on three of the six complaints received from Skyway workers. In one instance, it chose to review an April 2004 complaint from former KFM employees, using the compliance assistance approach outlined by its informal partnership agreement with KFM. Because the agreement precluded issuing citations if KFM promptly abated hazardous conditions, the division did not issue citations that otherwise are required when it found two alleged serious violations of health and safety regulations while investigating this complaint. In another instance, because of internal miscommunication, the division failed to investigate a complaint at all. Finally, despite state law requiring it to conduct on-site investigations for employee complaints having a reasonable basis, the division decided to use its nonemployee complaint procedure to handle a complaint it received from a KFM employee.

We recommended that if the division believes it will use the partnership model in the future, it should create a plan for how it will operate under the model so its activities will provide appropriate oversight and be aligned with state law. Specifically, it should ensure that roles and responsibilities are communicated clearly and that critical information is shared with all relevant individuals.

**Division’s Action: Partial corrective action taken.**

The division also discussed the continued use of the partnership model with the advisory committee. This discussion concluded that the division would attempt to keep as clear a separation as feasible between enforcement staff and compliance assistance staff when using the partnership model. Using its recent involvement with flavoring manufacturers located in California, the division indicates offering the manufacturers a consultative inspection in lieu of an enforcement inspection, with separate units performing these functions. The division’s discussion with the advisory committee did not conclude that there was a need for a plan for how it will operate under the partnership model. In addition, the division states it will keep the advisory committee informed on emerging partnerships and seek its input on significant issues.
Finding #3: Caltrans’ safety oversight on the Skyway project appears sufficient, but improvements could be made.

Although Caltrans worked to implement the safety oversight procedures required by its policies on the Skyway project, some improvements can be made to better emphasize safety. For example, the project safety coordinator’s position within the organization has limited independence from construction managers. In addition, because Caltrans’ inspectors observe the safety conditions of the work site while monitoring the construction and engineering aspects of KFM’s work, it is important that they are able to identify unsafe conditions. To do so, Caltrans’ policy and state regulations require that construction personnel attend safety meetings every 10 working days and attend general and job-specific hazard training. However, our review of the attendance records for a sample of Caltrans’ staff assigned to the Skyway project, including all seven construction managers who set an example for staff, indicated they have attended only 76 percent of safety classes identified as necessary for their jobs and only 66 percent of mandatory biweekly safety sessions.

To ensure that the project safety coordinator assigned to the Skyway project has the necessary independence and authority to evaluate and report on project safety, we recommended that Caltrans make this position be independent of the managers whose safety performance the coordinator must oversee. In addition, we recommended that Caltrans should ensure its construction managers and staff on the Skyway project attend the mandatory biweekly safety sessions and other necessary safety training.

Caltrans’ Action: Corrective action taken.

Caltrans indicates establishing a safety coordinator position that is responsible for overseeing employee and contractor safety on the East Span’s construction projects. To provide for the position’s independence, the position will submit safety reports to the East Span’s construction manager, but a safety manager from Caltrans’ District 4 office will supervise the position. An individual was hired for the position in October 2006. Caltrans also reports taking steps to improve attendance at required safety meetings and training, and indicates that employees’ attendance has improved.